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CONFLICT CERTIORARI JURISDICTION OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA:
THE "RECORD PROPER"
Just once, it would be helpful if my colleagues who follow the
Foley' majority would actually define what is meant by "record
proper" and "transcript of testimony." There is no clear-cut def-




Florida's district courts of appeal are intended in most cases to be
final courts of appeal 3 In certain cases appeal is permitted from a de-
cision of a district court of appeal;4 in others direct appeal from the
circuit court to the supreme court is allowed.5 The Florida Constitu-
tion gives the Supreme Court of Florida jurisdiction to review by
certiorari "any decision of a district court of appeal .. . that is in
direct conflict with a decision of any district court of appeal or of
the supreme court on the same question of law .. .."
In Lake v. Lake,7 decided shortly after the creation of the district
courts of appeal, the supreme court held that it would not "dig into
a record to determine whether or not a per curiam affirmance by a
district court of appeal conflicts" with a prior decision and thereby
gives jurisdiction to the supreme court." The court, however, left an
escape route for itself: "There may be exceptions to the rule that
this court will not go behind a judgment per curiam, consisting only
of the word 'affirmed' which does not reflect a decision that would
interfere with settled principles of law, rendered by a district court
of appeal...."
Seven years later the supreme court reconsidered its position and
allowed the exception to swallow the general rule. In Foley v. Weaver
1. Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 177 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1965).
2. Gibson v. Maloney, 231 So. 2d 823, 832 (Fla.) (Thornal, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 951 (1970).
3. See, e.g., Keegan v. State, 293 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1974); Johns v. Wainwright, 253
So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1971); Taylor v. Knight, 234 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
4. FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 3(b)(l). See comment, Certiorari Review of District court
of Appeal Decisions by the Supreme Court of Florida, 28 U. MIAMI L. REV. 952 (1974).
5. FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 3(b)(1)-(2).
6. FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
7. 103 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1958).
8. Id. at 643.
9. Id.
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Drugs, Inc.,10 the supreme court announced that where a district
court of appeal affirmed without opinion a trial court, the supreme
court could and would review the "record proper" to determine wheth-
er it had conflict certiorari jurisdiction.- The Foley court defined
"record proper" only in the broadest terms: "the written record of
the proceedings in the court under review except the report of the
testimony."' 2 One would suppose that this simple definition could
be easily implemented, but this has not been true. Since Foley, the
term "record proper" has caused much confusion.13
The court's reliance in Foley on the record proper appears to have
been an arbitrary compromise 14 between the court's Lake position,
with its concomitant respect for the finality of district court decisions,
and a position that would allow the supreme court absolute power
to examine for conflict district court per curiam decisions without
opinion. Using the record proper as a basis for conflict certiorari,
however, has created considerable problems. Given the present defini-
tion of the term, it is extremely difficult to determine what portion
of the record will be considered part of the record proper. Definitional
ambiguity encourages frivolous applications for conflict certiorari and
undercuts the finality of district court decisions.
This note does not offer a clear-cut definition of the record proper;
one does not exist. Thus it is unable to satisfy Justice Thornal's re-
quest. It does, however, attempt to identify a theoretical framework
that may be applied to the record below in determining what is part
of the record proper. In the course of that effort, it is assumed that
the supreme court will continue to use the term "record proper" to
designate those items it will consider when reviewing per curiam
decisions without opinion. It is also assumed that defining that term
with some degree of precision is more important than the content
of the definition chosen.
This note traces the growth of the technical record, or record
proper, from its common law origins to its modem definitions in
Florida and other jurisdictions. The discussion of Florida cases is
10. 177 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1965).
11. Id. at 223.
12. Id.
13. See note 2 and accompanying text supra; notes 96-114 and accompanying text
infra. See also Comment, supra note 4, at 968-69.
14. Cf. Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 177 So. 2d 221, 233-34 (Fla. 1965) (Thornal,
J., dissenting). Justice Thornal disagreed not only with the court's decision to review
the record proper, but with its application of that term. In his view, the term "record
proper" encompassed "only the actual pleadings and orders of the case." Gibson v.
Maloney, 231 So. 2d 823, 832 (Fla.) (Thornal, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
951 (1970).
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divided into pre-Foley and post-Foley analyses. The post-Foley cases
indicate the confusion and lack of predictability created by the current
definition of record proper. The pre-Foley cases, by contrast, demon-
strate that the record proper was once fairly well defined. The analysis
of pre-Foley cases focuses on two particularly troublesome areas-mo-
tions and affidavits-and the test once used by Florida courts to deter-
mine when those areas fell within the record proper. The thesis of
this note is that if Florida courts apply the theoretical framework
embodied in that test-which distinguished matters of fact from matters
of record-a higher level of predictability can be achieved.
The traditional definition of record proper did not evolve in
the context of conflict certiorari. It therefore does not reflect the central
consideration in conflict certiorari questions-the appropriate division
of judicial labor and power between the supreme court and the district
courts of appeal. Nonetheless, this note hopefully demonstrates that
the traditional definition offers a sound basis on which to build.
II. HISTORY OF THE RECORD
The first "record" in England was the Domesday Book.15 It consist-
ed of two volumes, written in the last years of the reign of William the
Conqueror," that contained the fiscal records of the realm. 7 In them
were listed the owners and subtenants of land, livestock, and other
assets that could be taxed by the Crown.' 8 The strict insistence of Ex-
chequer officials upon the correctness of the Domesday Book may have
led to the notion of a "record" as a technical object.' 9 If so, records
must be regarded as financial in origin; only later did they become
judicial. 20
The writ of certiorari emerged as a judicial tool used by the King
to check the justice handed out to his subjects by his barons. 21 The
writ was a means of controlling summary criminal convictions by
15. The two volumes were usually called the Great Domesday and Little Domesday,
although they had many other names. P. WINFIELD, THE CHIEF SOURCES OF ENGLISH
LEGAL HISTORY 110-11 (1925).
16. The books were begun in the seventeenth year of William the Conqueror's
reign and finished in 1086, the twentieth year of his reign. M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 70 (C. Gray ed. 1971).
17. P. WINFIELD, supra note 15, at 111.
18. T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 12 (5th ed. 1956).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Plucknett suggests that the writs originally were "mere administrative orders
from superior officials to their subordinates telling them to do something, to give
some information, or the like." T. PLUCKNETr, supra note 18, at 173. See generally de
Smith, The Prerogative Writs, XI CAMBRIDGE L.J. 40, 45-48 (1951).
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English county courts. 22 In the beginning, county courts were not
courts of record.23 What, then, was delivered to the appellate court
when a writ was issued calling for the record of the case? When the
writ was received by the county court, four knights or freemen were
dispatched to Westminster to recount what had happened in the
case. 24 They provided a narrative of the complaint and a summary
of the evidence produced in the baron's court.2 5 If the defendant
challenged this "record," a duel was waged to delete any errors.26
The advent of rolls of court-written records-can be traced to the
late twelfth century.2 7 At that time, the term "courts of record"
signified a special class of courts. "Courts of record were originally
those of the King's courts whose records enjoyed the privilege at com-
mon law of being treated as infallible ..... "I Those records could not
22. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *315-16; 10 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 244-46 (1938). See Abel, Materials Proper for Consideration in Certiorari
to Tribunals: 1, 15 U. TORONTO L.J. 102, 103 (1963).
The King used the writ of certiorari to satisfy his duty to his subjects to see that
justice was dispensed. M. BIGELOW, HISTORY OF PROCEDURE IN ENGLAND FROM THE NOR-
MAN CONQUEST 152 (1880). See also de Smith, supra note 21, at 48. The writ was also
used as a means of changing the venue of a case. E. JENKS, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW
66-67 (1929).
23. T. PLUCKNETr, supra note 18, at 93; Thorne, Notes on Courts of Record in
England, 40 W. VA. L.Q. 347, 355 (1934). Appellate proceedings from these county
courts were called "false judgment" but were analogous to certiorari proceedings. J.
BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 61 (1971).
24. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 18, at 93-94.
25. For an example of what was recounted, see id. at 121-23.
26. Id. at 94.
We before said, that courts were not bound to defend their records by duel;
but they were obliged to defend their judgments in that manner: as if any one
should declare against a court for passing a false judgment against him, and should
state it to be therefore false, because when one party said thus, and the other
answered thus, the court gave a false judgment thereon in such and such words,
and passed that judgment by the mouth of N. and should conclude, that if it
was denied, he was ready to prove it by a lawful witness there ready to deraign
it; in this case, the question might be decided by the duel. But there were some
doubts whether the court was to defend its judgment by one of his own mem-
bers, or by some stranger. Glanville seems to have been of the former opinion;
for, he says, the defence was to be by the person who passed the judgment.
I J. REEVES, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 153-54 (Dublin ed. 1787).
27. P. WINFIELD, supra note 15, at 128-33.
Pleas heard in the King's court (curia regis) seem to have been enrolled in
the last years of Henry IL.'s reign, but the earliest surviving rolls are of the year
1194. (6 Rich. I.)
From the time of Edward I. onward we have distinct series of records for the
King's bench (coram rege rolls), common pleas (de banco rolls), eyre, gaol-delivery,
etc.
F. MAITLAND & F. MONTAGUE, A SKETCH OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 2 n.1 (J. Colby ed.
1915), citing C. GRoss, SOURBES AND LITERATURE OF ENGLISH HISTORY 352 (1900).
28. G. RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 247 n.1 (1946).
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be and were not disputed.29 They consisted of acts and judicial pro-
ceedings of the court enrolled in parchment.2 0
Several types of rolls evolved: (1) process rolls, (2) recognizance
rolls, (3) imparlance rolls, (4) plea rolls, (5) issue rolls, (6) judgment
rolls, (7) scire facias rolls, (8) rolls of proceedings on writs of error and
false judgment, and (9) rolls of deeds and awards. The latter two rolls
were not important in determining appellate certiorari jurisdiction.
When a writ of certiorari was issued, the rolls pertaining to a case
were sent to Westminster by the court receiving the writ.3' The ap-
pellate court would restrict itself to these rolls when hearing an ap-
peal. 2
To understand what the technical record, or "record proper," was,
it is necessary to know what was written on these rolls. The following
is a summary of the types of entries found on the rolls used in
determining certiorari jurisdiction.
1. Process roll.-The warrant was recorded on this roll.13 In the
King's Bench the warrant was copied onto the roll; in the Common
Pleas the gist of the warrant was entered. Also noted on this roll were
the sheriff's return, any continuances, and the plaintiff's appearance. 34
29. The records were "of such high and supereminent authority, that their truth
is not to be called in question." 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24. See also J. BAKER,
supra note 23, at 61.
30. "A court of record is that where the acts and judicial proceedings are enrolled
in parchment for a perpetual memorial and testimony ..... 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES *24.
31.
The theory is that the Sovereign has been appealed to by some one of his
subjects who complains of an injustice done him in an inferior Court; whereupon
the Sovereign, saying that he wishes to be informed-certiorari-of the matter,
orders that the record, etc., be transmitted into a Court where he is sitting.
Rex v. Titchmarsh, 22 D.L.R. 272, 277-78 (Sup. Ct. Ont., App. Div. 1915).
32. S. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 47-48 (1969). In
those days the record might prove incomplete. Therefore, the bill of exceptions evolved
to allow the defendant to "make his own private supplement to the record." Id. at 48.
See notes 47-49 and accompanying text infra.
33. Until the time of Wright, C. J., if an action were commenced by warrants of
attorneys, these warrants were recorded on this separate roll. Wright caused these
warrants to be entered on the top of the issue roll. 1 W. TIDD, THE PRACTICE OF TIlE
COURTS OF KING'S BENCH, AND COMMON PLEAS, IN PERSONAL ACTIONS, AND EJECTMENT 95
(4th Am. ed. 1856).
Robert Wright had been chief justice of the Common Pleas for five days-April 16-21,
1687-when James II appointed him chief justice of the King's Bench. His predecessor
had been dismissed for refusing to grant an order for hanging a deserter. Wright's first
act was to grant that order. 7 E. Foss, JUDGES OF ENGLAND 282 (1864).
34.
And where a writ is sued out to avoid the statute of limitations, it should
regularly be entered on a roll, and docketed, with the sheriff's return thereto, and
continuances to the time of declaring. The writ should be entered on a roll of
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2. Recognizance roll.-A recognizance was an obligation to do
some particular act that a man entered into before a court of record
or duly authorized magistrate. 5 When an obligation was entered on the
roll, it became an obligation of record. A judge could then order exe-
cution on the obligation."6 Issuance of bail was also recorded on the
recognizance roll.37
3. Imparlance roll.-An imparlance was leave granted by the court
to answer the complaint at a specified time.38 Other continuances were
not recorded on this roll.39
4. Plea roll.-At first all entries on the plea rolls were made by the
that term wherein it was returnable; and, in the King's Bench, it is entered in
haec verba: after which the roll proceeds with an entry of the plaintiff's appearance,
the sheriff's return of non est inventus, and continuances of the process from term
to term, by vicecomes non misit breve, to the term of the declaration. In the Com-
mon Pleas, the roll merely contains a recital of the writ, with an entry of the
plaintiff's appearance, and sheriff's return, &c.
I W. TIDD, supra note 33, at 161-62 (footnote omitted).
35. 2 W. TIDD, supra note 33, at 1083. See also C. KEIGWIN, CASES IN COMMON LAW
PLEADING WITH SUMMARIES OF DOCTRINE UPON SEVERAL HEADS OF THAT SUBJECT 45-46 (2d
ed. 1934). A recognizance was also used as a means of probation.
A recognizance is a contract executed or acknowledged before a court of record (or
an officer authorized to take it) by a person, who thereby admits his indebtedness
to the Crown in a specified sum, such indebtedness to cease upon the fulfilment
of the condition enjoined by the Court, e.g., that the offender be of good behaviour
for six months ....
1 W. ODGERS & W. ODGERS, THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 179 (1911).
36. This procedure provided a method of confessing judgment. Many times a mer-
chant would insist on entering a recognizance before selling goods on credit. 2 W.
TIDD, supra note 33, at 1084-87. See generally A. HOGUE, ORIGINS OF TIE COMMON LAW
205-13 (1966). This "cognovit" was "a written confession of an action, supposed to be
given by the defendant in court, which authorizes the plaintiff, under circumstances
specified, to enter up judgment and issue execution thereon against the defendant." H.
BROOM, COMMENTARIES ON THE COMMON LAW DESIGNED AS INTRODUCTORY TO ITS STUDY
262 n.(l) (4th London ed. 1873).
37. E. JENKS, supra note 22, at 241. An issuance of bail was to be recorded on the
recognizance roll prior to the pleadings in the case. 1 W. TIDD, supra note 33, at 277.
38. "Imparlance is said to be, when the court gives a party leave to answer at
another time, without the assent of the other party; and in this sense, it signifies time
to reply, rejoin, surrejoin, &c. But the more common signification of imparlance is time
to plead: and it is either general [or special.]" 1 W. TIDD, supra note 33, at 462 (footnotes
omitted).
39.
Historically, the most interesting of these continuances [imparlance, curia ad-
visari vult, vicecomes non misit breve, and jurata ponitur in respectu] was that by
imparlance. It was a survival of the days of oral pleading in court, when each
pleader was expected to answer his adversary's pleading at once, unless the
court would grant him an imparlance, that is a delay to talk the matter over.
In spite of the rise of written pleadings, the law as to imparlances was in full
vigour when Stephen wrote the first edition of his book [Pleading] in 1824, and, as
might be expected, had given rise to a maze of minute rules.
9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 260 (3d ed. 1944) (footnotes omitted).
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clerks of the various courts.4 ° At that time lawyers had no control
over what was recorded in the plea roll.41 Since judgments were based
on the roll and not on the oral pleadings, the art of oral pleading was
to get a written reaction from the clerk. 2 Later, attorneys were allowed
to enter the pleadings themselves.
4
3
5. Issue roll.-The entries on this roll were summations of the
legal issues of the case.4" These entries were made by the lawyers in
the case, many times in the comfort of their offices.4 5 The judgment
in a case was also entered on this roll. From then on the roll was
called the judgment roll.
6. Scire facias roll.- All judgments on writs of scire facias were
entered on these rolls. A scire facias was a writ founded on some matter
of record, typically a recognizance or a judgment as recorded on its
respective roll.46 A writ of execution is the modern functional
equivalent of a writ of scire facias.
The above rolls comprised the technical record of a case, or what
has now become known as the record proper. If a modern court
were to follow a strict interpretation of record proper, the following
would be included: (1) the warrant, (2) the amount of bail, (3) any
leave for extension of time to answer, and the order concerning that
motion, (4) the pleadings, (5) the legal issues, (6) the judgment,
and (7) any order of execution issued upon that judgment.
III. THE DEFINITION OF RECORD PROPER IN AMERICAN
JURISDICTIONS OTHER THAN FLORIDA
At ancient common law the writ of error was the only means to
challenge a lower court decision. That writ, however, could only be
used to challenge errors that appeared on the record. There was no
means to challenge matters not included in the record, such as evidence
rulings and jury instructions.4 1
40.
The entries on the rolls were formerly made, in the King's Bench, by the
clerks of the chief clerk; as, in the Common Pleas, they were made by the
clerks of the prothonotaries, who were called entering clerks: but they are now
made in both courts by the attorneys ....
2 W. TWD, supra note 33, at 729 (footnote omitted).
41. T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 358 (2d ed. 1936).
42. Id. at 358-59.
43. See note 40 supra.
44. 2 W. TrDn, supra note 33, at 734.
45. Id. at 724-26.
46. Id. at 1090.
47. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 22, at 214-16.
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To relieve this, the Statute of Westminster 2, 13 Edw. I, ch. 31 (1
Eng. Stat. at L. 99; Bac. Abr., title "Bill of Exceptions"), was enact-
ed more than six hundred years ago, providing that one who alleged
an exception should write it out and require the justices to put
their seals to it, and that if upon review "the exception be not
found in the roll, and the plaintiff show the exception written,
with the seal of the justice put to, the justice shall be commanded
that he appear, etc., and if he cannot deny his seal they shall pro-
ceed to judgment according to the exception," etc.48
The bill of exceptions was thus a statutory means of bringing "into
the record the facts and the decision of the court, where it would
not otherwise appear therein. '" 41
Appellate courts would not consider matters that were mis-
classified. "Where matter which should be contained in the record
proper is set out only in the bill of exceptions, error assigned thereon
will not be considered. Matters not a part of the record proper must
be evidenced by the bill of exceptions." 50 It was thus crucial to dis-
tinguish matters that were part of the record proper from those
matters that became part of the record only through the bill of ex-
ceptions.
Legislatures eventually adopted statutes that required courts to
consider misclassified matter.5 ' There are, therefore, few recent cases
discussing the record proper. Older cases, however, contain extensive
discussion of the term.
A. Federal Decisions
In Clune v. United States,52 the Supreme Court recognized that
"[flrom time immemorial . . . [the record] has been held to include
the pleadings, the process, the verdict, and the judgment, and such
other matters as by some statutory or recognized method have been
made a part of it."3 The Court did not limit itself to the actual rolls
of the English courts; it added: "There are, for instance, in some States
statutes directing that all instructions must be reduced to writing,
marked by the judge 'refused' or 'given,' and attested by his signature,
and that when so attested and filed in the clerk's office they become a
part of the record." 54 Clearly these instructions would not have been
48. Nalle v. Oyster, 230 U.S. 165, 176 (1913).
49. Barnes v. Scott, 11 So. 48, 49 (Fla. 1892).
50. 1 C. CRANDELL, PRACTICE IN ACrIONS AT LAW § 495, at 748 (1928).
51. See, e.g., Fla. Laws 1927, ch. 12019, § 3 (repealed 1971).
52. 159 U.S. 590 (1895).
53. Id. at 593.
54. Id. at 593-94.
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part of the records of English courts. The Supreme Court's use of jury
instructions as an example implies that the Court was willing to expand
its definition of the record proper.
Federal circuit courts have not adopted a consistently broad or
narrow approach to the record proper. In Lewis v. United States,55
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that "[t]he record proper in a
criminal case consists of the pleadings, process, verdict and judgment.
It does not embrace interlocutory motions and rulings thereon, es-
pecially where the motion is supported by affidavits or evidence.'"
At common law it was clear that evidence and rulings on evidence
were not reviewable by a writ of certiorari.5 7 The Lewis court extended
the scope of this exclusion from motions based on evidence or affidavits
to all interlocutory motions and rulings thereon. The court was follow-
ing its previous ruling in Addis v. United States,58 in which it had
stated: "A statement in the transcript of the record that certain in-
structions were given, or requested and refused, or that a motion for
a directed verdict was made and denied, over the certificate of the
clerk, avails nothing.' ' 59 But the Addis court had relied on the fact
that the part of the record at issue was certified by the clerk of the
court and not by the judge. The Lewis court swept aside this distinc-
tion and limited the record proper to "the pleadings, process, verdict
and judgment."60
In Montgomery v. Erie R.R.,61 the Third Circuit realized that this
definition was too restrictive. While it recognized the general defini-
tion of record proper, it added that "[t]he strict record or record
proper in the case at bar must be deemed to include the warrant for
satisfaction of the judgment." 62 This is in keeping with the contents
of the English rolls of court. Such warrants would have been entered
on a scire facias roll and hence would have been considered part of
the technical record. 63
B. State Decisions
State courts have generally taken a narrow view of what constitutes
the record proper. For example, although an Oklahoma statute pro-
55. 92 F.2d 952 (10th Cir. 1937).
56. Id. at 953.
57. See notes 77-79 infra.
58. 62 F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1932).
59. Id. at 330.
60. 92 F.2d at 953.
61. 97 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1938).
62. Id. at 290.
63. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
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vided that "[t]he record shall be made up from the petition, the
process, return, the pleadings subsequent thereto, reports, verdicts,
orders, judgments, and all material acts and proceedings of the
court . . . ,",64 the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Tribal Develop-
ment Co. v. White Brothers- held that motions and orders thereon
were not part of the record proper.66
Fifty-four years later, however, the Oklahoma court in Short v.
Hale6 7 abandoned the distinction, implicit in White Brothers, between
the record proper and the statutorily defined "record." The Hale court
stated that the record proper "comprises all instruments and plead-
ings which by force of 12 O.S. 1961, § 704, form a part of the
record proper."6 Since this statute is substantially the same as the
statute construed by the White Brothers court, the court impliedly
overruled White Brothers and adopted a broad interpretation of
record proper.
At the same time, the Short court stated: "The term 'record' or
'record proper,' as used in reference to a transcript of the record, is
synonymous with the term 'judgment roll' at common law." 6 This
is clearly erroneous. Only the legal issues and the judgment were
entered on the judgment roll."' No court has limited the record proper
to these two items, and the Supreme Court of Oklahoma presumably
did not wish to do so. The court's confusion illustrates the uncertainty
that has surrounded the term "record proper."
Absent a statute some state courts have limited the concept of the
record proper. In State v. Copeland,7 the Supreme Court of North
Carolina held that "the record proper in criminal cases consists of
(1) the organization of the court, (2) the charge (information, warrant
or indictment), (3) the arraignment and plea, (4) the verdict, and
(5) the judgment."7 2 Other courts have limited the record proper to
these five items.73
More important are cases which explain what is not part of the
record proper. In DeLisle v. Spitler,'7 the Supreme Court of Missouri
held that " '[a]n abandoned petition is not part of the record prop-
64. Compiled Laws of Okla. 1909, § 5939.
65. 114 P. 736 (Okla. 1911).
66. Id., citing Menten v. Shuttee, 67 P. 478 (Okla. 1902). See cases cited 114 P. at 737.
67. 400 P.2d 816 (Okla. 1965).
68. Id. at 819.
69. Id.
70. See notes 44, 46 and accompanying text supra.
71. 199 S.E.2d 448 (N.C. 1973).
72. Id. at 450.
73. See, e.g., In re Arnold's Estate, 176 S.W.2d 837 (Mo. Ct. App. 1944).
74. 162 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. 1942),
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er .... ' ,5 The court had previously stated that "orders and decisions
of the court in the progress of the trial" were not part of the record
properY.7 These two decisions are in keeping with the history of the
English rolls of court.77
In Haun v. State,78 an Alabama court of appeals held that "'[a]n
appeal bond is no part of the record proper ....... 79The court relied
on a narrow definition of record proper and did not take notice of
what would have been recorded in the English court rolls. At common
law, a bond would have been recorded on the recognizance roll and
hence would have been part of the technical record. 0
IV. THE RECORD PROPER IN FLORIDA
In Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc.,)l the supreme court modified the
Lake rule that a per curiam decision by a district court of appeal
could not be reviewed by conflict certiorari. The Foley court held
that "this court may review by conflict certiorari a per curiam judg-
ment of affirmance without opinion where an examination of the
record proper discloses that the legal effect of such per curiam
affirmance is to create conflict with a decision of this court or another
district court of appeal.""2 The court defined record proper without
citing precedent as "the written record of the proceedings in the court
under review except the report of the testimony. ' ' 3 This broad def-
inition has proved unworkable because it is unclear what the supreme
court will consider part of "the written record of the proceedings in
the court under review." In cases since Foley the court has created
confusion by its ad hoc determination of what constitutes the record
proper.8 4 The term was not new in the jurisprudence of Florida, and
the court could have stated more precisely what is included in the
record proper.
A. Pre-Foley Record Proper
Prior to Foley, Florida cases drew a sharp distinction between
matters of record and matters in pais. Matters of record were included
75. Id. at 885, quoting Reinker v. Wesche, 117 S.W.2d 334, 335 (Mo. 1938).
76. Spotts v. Spotts, 55 S.W.2d 977, 980 (Mo. 1932).
77. See notes 33-46 and accompanying text supra.
78. 217 So. 2d 249 (Ala. Ct. App. 1968).
79. Id. at 251, citing Burton v. State, 109 So. 2d 311 (Ala. Ct. App. 1959).
80. See notes 35-37 and accompanying text supra.
81. 177 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1965).
82. Id. at 225.
83. Id. at 223.
84. See note 2 and accompanying text supra; notes 96-114 and accompanying text
infra.
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by definition in the record proper, while matters in pais were not. A
matter in pais is a "[m]atter of fact that is not in writing; thus dis-
tinguished from matter in deed and matter of record; matter that
must be proved by parol evidence."8 5
The matter of record-matter of fact dichotomy makes it possible
to determine what should be included in the term "record proper";
those portions of the record that are not matters of fact are part of the
record proper. While some might consider this a backdoor approach
to defining a term, it is at least workable and reasonably precise when
applied in the context of existing case law. This section briefly examines
case law in troublesome areas-affidavits, motions, and orders thereon-
to illustrate the approach Florida courts have traditionally taken in
defining the record proper.
Prior to the enactment of curative statutes, it was necessary for
courts to determine whether matters were properly includable in
the record proper or in the bill of exceptions. 6 To make those deter-
minations, courts divided motions into those based on law and those
based on facts. For instance:
The motion in arrest of judgment [used to contest legal in-
sufficiencies apparent on the face of the judgments or pleadings,7 ]
is a matter of record. The motion for a new trial [used to seek
reexamination of a factual issue following the verdict or decision as]
is a matter in pais. One should be evidenced by the record proper
and the other by the bill of exceptions.89
Similarly, motions for a change of venue were considered to be
matters in pais when based on factual allegations concerning the state
of mind of the community from which the jury would be drawn.
Even after curative statutes granted appellate courts power to consider
factual matters not included in a bill of exceptions, the courts con-
tinue to characterize change of venue motions as matters in pais.
It is contended that the motion for change of venue, being matter
in pais, was not a part of the record proper and and cannot be con-
sidered unless embraced in a properly authenticated bill of excep-
tions.
85. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1130 (4th ed. 1968).
86. See notes 47-50 and accompanying text supra.
87. See Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co. v. Baker, 4 So. 2d 333, 334, 336 (Fla. 1941).
88. See Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Anderson, 73 So. 837, 837-38 (Fla. 1917).
89. Holstun v. Embry, 169 So. 400, 404 (Fla. 1936). Similarly, an amendment to a
motion for a new trial is not part of the record proper. Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co. v.
Baker, 4 So. 2d 333, 334 (Fla. 1941).
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Such was the common-law rule and still appears to be the rule
in some jurisdictions.... If this rule of the common law was ever in
force in this state, it was modified by [Fla. Laws 1927, ch. 12019,
§3] 90
This distinction between matters of record and matters of fact was
also drawn when considering affidavits. If an affidavit took the place of
a pleading, it was considered part of the record proper.
The proceeding by attachment is a summary one, strictly statutory,
and was a stranger to the common-law method of practice and pro-
cedure. The statutory affidavit and bond upon which the writ issues,
and, when contested by the defendant, the latter's affidavit travers-
ing the initiatory affidavit of the plaintiff, are jurisdictional, and
constitute the statutory pleadings in the cause. The issue of fact
thus raised as to whether the writ is to be sustained or dissolved is
formed, tried, and determined exclusively upon them. When filed,
they become matters of record, and stand as and for the pleadings
in the cause, and, when brought into question in an appellate court,
constitute the record proper of the case, and have no place in a bill
of exception, whose sole office is to evidence to an appellate court
matters purely in pais.91
On the other hand, evidentiary affidavits were not considered part
of the record proper. In an appeal of a condemnation award setting
just compensation, the defendant attempted to show by affidavit that
the jury was not impartial. The supreme court disallowed this attempt,
saying:
The second of the reasons urged here for reversal of the judg-
ment, viz. that it was shown by the defendant below on his motion
for vacation of the award of the viewers, by uncontradicted affidavits,
that the viewers were not fair and impartial, we cannot consider,
even if it were not already effectually disposed of in what has been
already said. If there were any such affidavits presented in support
of such motion, the only way that they could be so evidenced to
this court as that we could recognize or consider them was to have
preserved them in a bill of exceptions duly authenticated by the
90. McMichael v. Harris, 174 So. 323, 324 (Fla. 1937) (citations omitted; emphasis
added).
91. Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. Grunthal, 20 So. 809, 811 (Fla. 1896).
The writ of attachment is also a part of the record. Motions addressed to an at-
tachment affidavit and to a writ of attachment which are a part of the pleadings
should, with the orders thereon, be evidenced to the appellate court by the
record proper and not by bill of exceptions.
CA. Williams Co. v. Roberts & Geiger, 86 So. 433 (Fla. 1920).
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judge below. There is no bill of exceptions in the record here, and,
though the alleged affidavits are recited and copied into the record
by the clerk below, they form no part of the record proper in the
cause; and the ipse dixit of the clerk below in reference thereto is
no evidence to an appellate court of their existence or use in the
court below.9 2
Affidavits as to matters occurring or introduced at trial were also
excluded from the record proper. In Maddox v. Barr, 3 a civil habeas
corpus proceeding, a certified copy of the decree of divorce bore an
"indorsement of the circuit judge that no such decree was submitted
to him on the hearing, and that the attorney for petitioner stated he
did not have the decree .... .,,4 The supreme court held that it
could not consider affidavits of the petitioner's attorney or the clerk
of the court below that had been copied into the record, which affi-
davits were presumably in conflict with the trial judge's indorsement,
because they were not part of the record proper and there was no
bill of exceptions."
Prior to Foley the supreme court drew a sharp distinction between
motions and affidavits based on questions of fact and those based on
questions of law. This distinction might have helped the Foley court
formulate a definition of the record proper. The Foley court, however,
ignored the old cases and adopted a definition that has produced con-
siderable uncertainty.
B. Post-Foley Record Proper
The post-Foley cases adopt an extremely broad definition of the
record proper. The supreme court has recognized the traditional ele-
ments of the record proper, but it has not distinguished between
matters of record and matters of fact. In White v. Pinellas County,96
allegations in the complaint were held to be part of the record prop-
er.9 7 Certain types of motions also have been considered part of the
record proper: motions to sever,98 motions to dismiss,99 and motions
92. Heermans v. Jacksonville, St. A. & I.R. Ry., 23 So. 587, 589 (Fla. 1898).
93. 38 So. 766 (Fla. 1905).
94. Id. at 767.
95. Id.
96. 185 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 1966).
97. Id. at 471. See also Commerce Nat'l Bank v. Safeco Ins. Co., 284 So. 2d 205 (Fla.
1973); Balbontin v. Porias, 215 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 1968); Saf-T-Clean, Inc. v. Martin-
Marietta Corp., 197 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1967).
98. Godshall v. Unigard Ins. Co., 255 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1971).
99. Saf-T-Clean, Inc. v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 197 So. 2d 8, 10 (Fla. 1967).
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to transfer for improper venue.100 In Andersen v. State,'0' a law en-
forcement agent's affidavit that provided the basis for a search warrant
was considered part of the record proper.'0 2 Jury instructions also have
been examined by the court to vest conflict certiorari jurisdiction in
itself.103
The definition in Foley of the record proper expressly excluded
"the report of the testimony."'' 14 Nonetheless, where testimony "appears
in excerpted form within the complaint, orders of the court, the ap-
pellate decisions, [and other parts of the record proper],"'1 0 5 it will be
considered part of the record proper. The supreme court, however,
was not content with these self-imposed restrictions concerning what
testimony it could consider. In Pauline v. Borer,00 "findings by the
examiner, final order of the Real Estate Commission, evidentiary docu-
ments and the opinion of the District Court of Appeal"'' 7 were held
to be part of the record proper. In Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown Develop-
ment Authority,0 the supreme court used "a portion of the deposi-
tion testimony of the executive director of respondent" to establish
conflict. 109 Clearly this violates even the Foley definition of the record
proper. 1" 0
In AB CTC v. Morejon,'1' "the majority ... expanded the defini-
tion of 'record proper' to include affidavits appended to trial motions
and trial transcripts from a different proceeding which are exhibits in
briefs." 112 "The trial court [had] permitted respondent to incorporate
into [the] record [of AB CTC] the record of a prior law suit including
100. Id.
101. 274 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 1973).
102. Id. at 229.
103. Short v. Grossman, 245 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1971); Gibson v. Maloney, 231 So. 2d
823 (Fla.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 951 (1970); Sinclair Refining Co. v. Butler, 190 So. 2d
313 (Fla. 1966).
104. Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 177 So. 2d 221, 223 (Fla. 1965).
105. Commerce Nat'l Bank v. Safeco Ins. Co., 284 So. 2d 205, 207 n.2 (Fla. 1973).
106. 274 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
107. id. at 2 (emphasis added).
In Sinclair Refining Co. v. Butler, 190 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1966), the supreme court
held that it could examine the record proper to ascertain conflict even when the
district court of appeal wrote a decision. The district court there "did not discuss
the point of law involved and simply held, in general terms, that the trial court did
not commit 'harmful error' in its ruling on the matter in question." Id. at 315. Since
the jury charge in question was assigned as error and the district court affirmed without
discussion of this point, the supreme court looked at the record proper to ascertain
whether conflict existed.
108. 315 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1975).
109. Id. at 459 (Overton, J., dissenting).
110. See id; note 114 infra.
111. No. 45,903 (Fla. July 24, 1975).
112. Id. at 9 n.7 (England, J., dissenting).
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affidavits, depositions, and trial testimony." "Is The supreme court
looked to these items in determining whether it had conflict certiorari
jurisdiction. It is unclear why the mere fact that the trial court allowed
plantiff to incorporate into the record portions of a previous trial's
transcript and evidence should make these matters part of the record
proper. It would seem that the supreme court was not distinguishing
the record from the record proper.
The post-Foley cases lead to one conclusion: where the supreme
court is interested in the merits of the controversy before it, it will
examine the entire record, not merely the record proper, in determin-
ing whether it has conflict certiorari jurisdiction. A change in this
practice, however, may be forthcoming. 114
V. CONCLUSION
From a historical viewpoint, it is clear that the supreme court has
strayed far afield when reviewing the record proper. One approach to re-
solving the resulting confusion is to cease using the term "record
proper" to indicate the boundaries of the court's power to review for
conflict district court decisions without opinion. The court might,
for instance, declare that it stands ready to consider the entire record
below in determining whether it has conflict jurisdiction. This posi-
tion, however, is inimical to the notion that district courts are general-
ly final courts of appeal.
Alternatively, the court could replace the troublesome term with
a comprehensive list of specific matters to be considered in reviewing
the record below. If the court abandoned its de facto practice of looking
113. Id. at 2.
114. Justice Overton's dissenting opinion in Baycol noted:
The term "record proper" has a restrictive meaning .... Generally, exhibits
have never been considered as part of the record proper except those exhibits
that are part of the initial pleading in the cause ...
.. .Clearly, exhibits and depositions are not "record proper."
. . . This Court previously stated that we are not merely a "'court of se-
lected errors' whereby the Justices of this Court could whimsically select cases for
review in order to satisfy some notion that the case would be of such importance
as to justify the interest or attention of this Court." . . . The decisions of the
District Courts are final except under situations where review by the Supreme
Court is clearly authorized by the Constitution.
315 So. 2d at 459-60 (citations omitted). Justice Overton suggested that he is disposed to re-
consider Foley if that case allows the supreme court "to take jurisdiction in [a] cause
[such as Baycol]." Id. at 16.
In AB CTC, Justice England in dissent was more forceful: "[T]he time for re-evalua-
tion of Foley is at hand. I am ready to do that now." No. 45, 903 at 9. Justice Overton
concurred in Justice England's dissent.
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at the entire record whenever it so desires, it would be better able to
manage its docket. Moreover, practitioners would know precisely what
the court would consider when reviewing a petition for conflict cer-
tiorari where the district court's decision is without opinion. Un-
fortunately, this approach lacks the flexibility necessary to insure that
future cases in conflict with prior district or supreme court decisions
would be reviewable by the supreme court.
A third means of escaping the difficulties created by the term "record
proper" is to readopt the position taken in Lake v. Lake.11 That posi-
tion, however, would effectively eliminate certiorari review of district
court per curiam decisions without opinion. It would thus keep the
court from fulfilling its
duty, as the "supervisory body in the judicial system" of this state,
Ansin v. Thurston, Fla. 1958, 101 So. 2d 808, 810, . . .to maintain
uniformity and harmony in the decisions of our appellate courts,
and to resolve the conflict created by a decision which is, "out of
harmony with a prior decision of this Court or another Court of
Appeal on the same point, thereby generating confusion and in-
stability among the precedents." Kyle v. Kyle, Fla. 1962, 139 So. 2d
885, 887.118
The above approaches are unsatisfactory. Each fails to strike an ade-
quate balance between competing policy considerations: the fact that
district courts of appeal were created as final courts of appeal, and
the need for uniformity and harmony in the law of this state. That
balance cannot be achieved unless the court retreats from its present
practice.
The basic Foley approach-considering only the record proper in
determining whether district court decisions without opinion conflict
with other decisions-might produce an acceptable balance. The
difficulty with Foley is not its reliance on the record proper, but its
expansive definition of the term-"the written record of the proceed-
ings in the court under review except the report of the testimony. '
The court should replace that definition with one that reduces the
number of matters subject to review while increasing predictability
and retaining a measure of flexibility.
Historically, a sharp line has been drawn between matters of re-
cord and matters in pais when determining the content of the record
proper. The court should readopt this theoretical framework to help
115. See notes 7-9 and accompanying text supra.
116. Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 177 So. 2d 221, 224 (Fla. 1965).
117. Id. at 223.
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it decide what is in the record proper. All matters of law and no
matters of evidence should be considered part of the record proper.
This is not to suggest that the court should blindly follow old case
law in classifying portions of the total record. The old Florida cases
were not decided in the context of conflict certiorari, and today's court
might well reach different conclusions as to what items should be re-
garded as matters of law and what items should be treated as matters
of evidence. Nonetheless, existing case law could be expected to pro-
vide persuasive guidance to courts and attorneys, and thereby foster
predictability.
This approach offers several advantages other than increased pre-
dictability. First, it allows the supreme court to exercise a measure of
supervision over the way Florida law is applied in summary decisions
of district courts. Some control of those decisions is needed to maintain
uniformity and harmony in Florida law. Secondly, this approach re-
stricts the current de facto jurisdiction of the supreme court, and there-
by emphasizes that district courts are final courts of appeal in most
situations. Finally, if the court reasserts the distinction between matters
of record and matters in pais, a distinction well grounded in this
state's jurisprudence, it would retain a measure of flexibility. Although
the supreme court would deny itself the power to review matters
in pais, it would ultimately define the modern content of that term.
It might do so with an eye to expanding or restricting its conflict cer-
tiorari jurisdiction. Hopefully it would approach this secondary def-
initional problem by asking whether particular types of motions,
affidavits, orders, or other documents traditionally regarded as matters
in pais are so likely to raise serious legal issues as to require the court
to reclassify them as matters of record, and thereby subject them to
supreme court examination.
ROGER J. KLURFELD
